Ethnicity and Refugees by Adelman, Howard
 ETHNICITY AND REFUGEES
by
Howard Adelman
"No enduring world order can be created which ignores the
ubiquitous yearnings of nations in search of roots in an ethnic
past, and no study of nations and nationalism that completely ignores
that past can bear fruit."1
The New World Disorder
Once upon a time, not very long ago, in fact, a very, very short
time ago, ideological conflict, particularly the conflict between
western liberal democracy and authoritarian communism, between the
primacy of the individual and the critical importance of class and the
economic collectivity, was acted out within the domestic politics of
many less developed states. The two sides in a domestic conflict were
supplied with arms by the superpower leaders of the two rival
ideological blocs. Neither of the domestic disputants necessarily
identified themselves with either ideology. One might have been a
military dictatorship with some depth of populist support, though the
regimes supported by the Soviet Union and/or China were more likely to
identify themselves as communist or socialist than the other side's
likelihood of identifying itself as liberal. In 
fact, regimes supported by the United States were often an amalgam of
traditional elites (feudal, military, financial) rather than liberal
democratic constituencies.
In Vietnam, the result of this conflict in ideologies fought
through surrogates was the largest resettlement program for refugees of
the last quarter century. In Afghanistan, five million refugees waited
in Pakistan and Iran for the war to end so they could return. Even in
Ethiopia, many if not most refugees were seen to be products of
ideological conflict because Mengitsu, the military dictator who
usurped power in a coup, was an avowed Marxist, thereby obscuring the
nationalist origins of the conflict in Eritrea and other areas.
Ideological conflict not only appeared to dominate as a root cause
of the production of refugees, but the three solutions envisaged were
primarily based on the premise that refugees were a product of
ideological conflict. After the beginning of the Cold War, Greek
refugees could return to Greece once the communist insurgency was
defeated and the new western-oriented political system took hold.
Similarly in Afghanistan, the refugees await repatriation after the
fall of the Communist government in Kabul, assuming it does fall.
2Repatriation, settlement and resettlement, in that order, were seen as
the only three forms of permanent solution for refugees.
The Western democracies were the main political and economic
supporters of this new refugee regime. It was the humanistic side of
the cold war arms race and the balance of power system. Refugees would
be financed to settle in adjacent states to await resettlement when the
communist regime was defeated. Only where victory over the communists
in a reasonable time did not seem to be possible, were refugees from
Cuba and Vietnam massively resettled in Western countries, primarily
the United States, the leader of the Western side in the Cold War.
Otherwise settlement and repatriation were to be utilized as permanent
solutions.
 
These post war solutions to refugee situations were very different
than the pre-war ones when the cause of refugee flows was seen to
reside primarily in ethnic conflict rather than in economic and
political ideology. Then, three very different permanent solutions were
utilized - redrawing borders, exchanging populations and international
guarantees for minority rights. They stand in marked contrast to the
solutions mandated to the UNHCR - repatriation, settlement and
resettlement. For the latter are premised on the sanctity of the
borders and integrity of sovereign states, a rationale possibly created
to resist messianic universalist communist ideology. 
In the last two years, we witnessed the demise of one ideological
system that for forty or seventy years dominated a good part of the
world. What is perhaps even more remarkable has been the resurgence in
faith in liberalism and even capitalism from those throwing off the
yoke of oppression. But we have also seen the reemergence of ethnic
conflict as the prime cause of refugee flows. Certainly, in Eastern
Europe borders are under question as regional communist empires
collapse from the weight of their own economic mismanagement and
suppression of freedom. And this is only the beginning. The implosion
of India, of Indonesia, of the largest country in Africa, Nigeria, has
yet to occur, though each has had or is experiencing degrees of
rebellion against central state authority. The rebellion of the Sikhs
or of the Ibos were not akin to the secessionist Southern states in the
USA forced to reunite to forge the common American nation. For India,
Indonesia and Nigeria are not nations forged by states, but each
consists of nations which existed prior to the construction of the
state. The question is whether, when these nationalist forces erupt in
these and other states all over the world in a way that will make the
present period appear relatively tranquil, will the world abandon the
post-war refugee regime for a pre-war one? More seriously for refugees,
3will Western, particularly U.S. support for any refugee regime wane
with the demise of the Cold War? 
Certainly, in Europe and in the three major resettlement
countries, Australia, Canada and the United States, there has been
growing resistance to the large number of spontaneous arrivals claiming
refugee status. The numbers are not the only problem. The high cost of
processing individual claimants through a quasi-judicial system weighs
upon the overburdened economies of these states. The relatively small
numbers that are actually deported after utilizing this whole
cumbersome process is another factor. The fact is, the refugee claims
system is more and more perceived as a back door for immigration for
those fleeing economically depressed and strife-torn regions. Western
states, particularly their mandarins, see themselves as losing control
over their borders and their own rights to self-determination,
including the right to determine who can and who cannot become members
of their polity. With the demise of any ideological motive, will the
humanistic motive be insufficient to preserve the legal system so
painfully constructed since World War II for the protection of
refugees, particularly when the cause of refugee flows increasingly
shifts from the fear of persecution from a tyrannical state apparatus
to messy conflicts between rival nationalities and potentially much
larger mass movements of refugees?
Nationalism and Ideology
To get some handle on this shift or reversal in the prime cause
of refugee flows from ideology, or military coups in the guise of
ideology, to conflicts between nationalist groups, an outline sketch of
ethnicity or nationalism as a source of conflict and refugee flows
might be helpful.2 Unlike communism, which claimed to be a scientific
and universal solution at odds with its alternative universal
competitor, liberal capitalism based on the primacy of the individual,
nationalism was depicted as a belief which "glorified the peculiar and
the parochial, national differences and national individualities."3
Nationality was that part of an identity which expressed the
"continuity between one's construal of past ancestry and future
aspirations in relation to ethnicity."4  However, unlike ethnicity per
se, nationality, for some, identified those future aspirations with, "a
group seeking to find its expression in what it regards as the highest
form of organized activity, the sovereign state."5 The aim of
nationalists "is national self-determination, and the llasting
fulfillment which comes to man when he lives as a member of a sovereign
nation."6 
4Some went further and argued that nationality in its essence
demanded exclusivity and homogeneity, a vision attributed (erroneously,
I believe) to the heritage of the Hebrews. Christianity inherited the
universalistic strain of Messianism, according to this interpretation,
by building on the spiritual and cultural heritage, while nationalism
was erected on a primitive racial and materialistic conception to
develop a nationalistic Messianism considered as "the will to live
dominantly and triumphantly as a rehabilitated people in a national
home."7
The people. The home. In fact, nationalism itself has not been the
problem. The problem has always been determining who belongs and the
territory which belongs to that people. Thus, Irish nationalists claim
Ulster Protestants are part of the Irish people, and, for the IRA, the
Protestant resident's of Belfast's failure to accept that fact means
they deserve death as traitors. Further, it is all of Eire that belongs
to the Irish people. The non-violent nationalists may condemn the
murders, but do not revise their beliefs, doctrines or constitution
that provide the rationale for the violence.8 Even when nationalism is
redefined primarily as a matter of inner identification and a desire to
belong to the same state (a Staatsnation), a people committed by an act
of collective will to belong to a common administrative, legal and
political regime united by sentiment and a formal legal regime, rather
than being defined in terms of empirical attributes such as language,
culture and/or religion which use myth and symbolism to reinforce
memory and values (Kulturnation)9, there remains the question of where
to draw territorial borders. Should the Catholics of Northern Ireland
be allowed to secede and join the Irish Republic? 
The demise of the universalist ideology of communism has
resurrected the nationalist question in Eastern Europe as a primary
issue. It, of course, was always a central issue which Marxists could
not resolve. Rosa Luxemburg denied there was a right to national self-
determination, opposed nationalism in principle as leading to
fragmentation and opposed it in practice when she founded the Social
Democratic Party of Poland denying a Polish right to political self-
determination while granting a right to cultural autonomy and a degree
of administrative self-government to a Polish nation that had
heretofore been divided between the Tsarist Regime, the Austro-
Hungarian Empire and Prussia.10 Lenin, in contrast, emphasized the right
of self-determination, but also recognized the tendency to
fragmentation so that the right to self-determination was given de jure
recognition but, sooner or later, denied any realization in practice.
Initially, the Soviet revolutionaries under the Leninist doctrine
recognized the independence of Finland and the Baltic republics. But at
5the first opportunity, the Baltic states were reabsorbed into the
Russian Empire under Stalin, who had all along opposed Lenin's policy
of recognizing a right to national self-determination.11 Earlier on, the
Menshevik separatists of Georgia were quickly drawn into rejoining the
Bolshevik Soviet Empire as "equal" national partners along with
independent republics such as Azerbaijan and Armenia. The reality was
that a fifth column was used to take over the independent revolutionary
governments which then "voluntarily" joined or became subordinate to
the power of the Soviet federation, failing only where and as long as
Western military intervention (an expeditionary German force under von
der Goltz in Finland, for example) or the defeat of the Red Army
allowed independent nation-states to sustain themselves. Communists
could not tolerate secession and the realization of national self-
determination. Tito, who was more tolerant of nationalist self-
determination than any other Communist ruler, also clamped down on the
Croation secessionists in 1972. With the demise of communism,
nationalism has reasserted itself. In Yugoslavia, where the communists
retain power in Serbia, they were unwilling to accept the secession of
Croatia, particularly since Croatia contains large numbers of Serbs. 
The issue of national self-determination permeates a number of
conflicts around the world as well as in Eastern Europe. Eritrea, a
former Italian colony, was forcefully made a federated state of
Ethiopia by the United Nations after World War II, with the right of
self-determination after ten years, a right not only denied, but even
its limited autonomy was taken away. Kurds, promised an independent
state after World War I, were in fact divided up among Turkey, Iraq,
Iran and the Soviet Union. Today Saddam Hussein of Iraq again makes a
pretence of recognizing Kurdish autonomy which he will again
undoubtedly undermine when he regains the power to do so. China refuses
the right of Tibet to self-determination as does any government that
believes that power comes out of the barrel of a gun rather than from
the consent of a free people.
What attitude does the victorious universalist belief, liberalism,
have towards nationalism? A more pragmatic one. In the short term,
stability was primary for the development of capitalism. In the name of
international peace and order, after World War I, national self-
determination, the division of each separate nationality into a
sovereign state, was to be the guide in the subsequent peace agreement.
The Czechs, the Slavs, the Rumanians, the Kurds, the Arabs still ruled
by Turkey, were all promised their own states. The major principle
running through Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points was the right of all
peoples to live in liberty and safety. Frontiers were to be redrawn
along 'clearly recognizable lines of nationality'. Why? 
6The answer goes back to John Stuart Mill's Whig theory of
nationalism.
Nationalism was not valued in itself, but was simply seen to be useful
on the basis that the commonality of a people tended to give
representative government a better chance of working. Government by and
for the people was the primary principle, not nationalism. "A portion
of mankind may be said to constitute a Nationality if they are united
among themselves by common sympathies which do not exist between them
and any others-which make them cooperate with each other more willingly
than with other people, desire to be under the same government, and
desire that it should be government by themselves or any portion of
themselves exclusively."12 It was a vision of a Staatsnation united by
inner identification and sentiment and fused together by a collective
act of will to create a common legal regime.
That meant, however, where national self-determination might lead
to disorder and conflict, or where liberty was not an immediate
prospect, the self-determination of nations, which was General Smuts
first principle as the foundation of the League of Nations, was
sacrificed to the need for international order. The Mandate system
ended up, not as a vehicle for the orderly development of self-
government of a people, but as a mode of perpetuating imperial control
through zones of influence, allowing national conflicts, as in the case
of Palestine, to fester. The recognition of national self-determination
was subordinated to the interests of the imperial powers almost as much
in the West as in the new Communist empires of the East. In the words
of the author of the famous statement, "Power corrupts; absolute power
corrupts absolutely," Lord Acton, "making the nation the mould and
measure of the State" had to be subordinated to what was in effect a
superior military power. For nationalism was not only an illegitimate
but a dangerous and irrational force. For Acton, a balance system among
various nationalities kept in check by the monopoly on military power
of the state was preferable to regimes built on purely nationalist
lines. Thus, the nationalist rivalries within India and Sri Lanka (then
Ceylon) were suppressed. Today the world is the inheritor of those
suppressed conflicts and refugees have been the product of the angry
and intolerant form in which they have reemerged.
Nationalism - Scourge or Creative Force
There were, however, some who defended nationalism, not as simply
as useful tool of liberalism (John Stuart Mill) or of communism
(Lenin), but who saw it as a good in its own right. Nationalism was not
the mother of all wars, but was, "the mother of all creations on
earth." For nationalism was identified with a life force, "innate,
7organic and genetic," the basis of natural power and the inner genius
of being."13 Why? Because nationalism used language, and "language has
its origin in our animal nature."14 Language builds a culture continued
through tradition and transmitted by education. "Education, which
performs the function of transmitting social traditions, can be said to
be genetic, by virtue of the manner in which the transmission takes
place, and organic, by virtue of the manner in which that which is
being transmitted is assimilated and applied."15  Therefore, "a nation
is as natural a plant as a family, only with more branches. Nothing,
therefore, in more manifestly contrary to the purpose of political
government than the unnatural enlargement of states, the wild mixing of
various races and nationalities under one sceptre."16 War for conquest
is not the result of nationalism, but its antithesis. Further, it is
because all humans use language that they are endowed with sympathy and
fellow feeling, the basis of moulding humans together into nations
willing to defend each other from conquest by others, but also the
basis of caring for all of humanity.
However, for some, such as Fichte, this became a rationale for
exalting the national will and dreaming of a homogeneous nation where
the will would not be contaminated. Language expressed the national
character.17 Original languages were superior to mongrel derivative
languages and German needed to be purified to avoid the same fate.
Further the individual was to identify totally with the nation and the
state would regulate all aspect of the individual's life. Individual
rights and individuals apart from the state were phantoms. This
entailed purifying the nation, expelling minorities and uniting all
those of the same language and nationality under the same political
roof, hence, requiring the elimination of "internal" borders and
further purges of minorities which were weakening the national volk.
Other thinkers, such as G.W.F. Hegel, moved in the opposite
direction. Nationalism had to be subsumed under the rule of law and a
state regime, not because nationalism per se was inherently dangerous,
but because it was unrealized in its fullest expression of freedom if
it remained merely at the level of tradition and custom, or even when
developed into self-conscious cultural expressions and activities. A
Kulturnation had to become a Staatsnation. The freedom of the
individual had to be objectified in laws and principles which
explicitly recognized and protected freedom as fundamental. And those
laws and principles had to be made universal and international. This,
in fact, has been the case with the Universal Principles of Rights and
Freedoms and such agreements as have evolved for the protection of
refugees. The political sentiment of patriotism is most manifest when
it is attached to upholding the duty to protect human rights and
8freedoms in all situations and which recognizes and defends the right
of individuals and groups to be different. Nationalism which manifests
itself in the Rule of Law is nationalism which leads to a state which
is a defender rather than suppressor of differences, which protects
individual and minority rights rather than oppressing individuals and
rejecting minorities from living in or participation in the state.
Further, this nationalism was not "natural" and "genetic", was not
something given and primordial which existed outside the trajectory of
history, but is a product of history. Nations have disappeared. Nations
have been reborn. Nations have combined. At those magical turning
points that occur in history and through which we are once again
living, those elements so constitutive of a Kulturnation rooted in
ethnic consciousness, common language, memory and symbols, reassert
themselves for a place in the sun and an opportunity to find a
political and legal form which will protect the continuity of those
people.
There was, however, another reason for nations to be constituted
in a state. Nations had to have their own states so they could properly
live under the rule of law and have the full benefit of freedoms
guaranteed to all. Nationalism, in this sense, is not merely a
convenient tool of Whig ideology to unite men so they could elect
governments which would protect the right of every individual to pursue
his or her own selfish interests. Freedom was not just the right to
pursue self interest. Freedom was a matter of universal right and one
that had to be guaranteed to all by the rule of law which, though
administered through states, had to become universal.
But nationalism, the basis for building states, the rule of law
and the protection of freedom in its fullest sense, and not in the
narrow sense of merely the right to pursue one's own self interest,
could also be used for xenophobic and destructive purposes, for the
expression of subjective feeling at the expense of another nation. If
this was not to be the case, then all nations had to have states which
made the rule of law and the protection of rights and freedoms primary.
The break up of imperial states, the desire for nations to realize the
expression of their unique identities through a sovereign state, is not
the road to ruin but the path to a new international order built on the
rule of law and the protection of the freedom of individuals, the
equality of groups and the full realization of each unique nation.  
Nationalism and Freedom
An ethnic group is not a nation. For a nation requires a territory
9in which it is dominant, a state which protects and develops the unique
qualities of that nation but also protects the equal rights of all its
citizens under the rule of law.
However, if the state is also dedicated to protecting and enhancing the
ethos of its staatsvolk, the dominant nationality, as Giuseppe Mazzini,
the father of Italian nationalism, wrote in his essay, "The Duties of
Man", the responsibility for preserving and enhancing the national
character meant that all citizens had to be inculcated with a common
national tradition. This poses problems - both for the right of
individuals to deviate and challenge that thinking and the symbols of
that national thought as well as to ethnic minorities that desire to
preserve their own national traditions within the envelope of a legal
state where they are citizens.
Is it an expression of freedom to burn the flag of the United
States of America when challenging the militaristic side of the
national tradition which allows America to engage so easily in foreign
military exercises, whether intended for good or greed? Is it an
expression of cultural and religious freedom for a Sikh to enrol in the
Royal Canadian Mounted Police and insist on wearing a turban,
challenging the traditional image of the uniform of that force? Is it
an expression of freedom to insult the head of state whether that head
of state is a monarch who inherited her thrown, an appointed ex-
politician or an elected current one?
These are the simple issues. What happens when two nationalities
have claims to the same territory - Palestine, the Armenian enclave of
Nagorno-Karabakh inside Azerbaijan? What happens when several
nationalities share the same territory and state and one of them is not
dominant, as in Uganda. What is the national ethos. The fact is the
national question appears easier to solve when a "new nation" is being
founded under a secular constitutional faith, as in the United States,
so that the national sensibilities of various minorities and indigenous
nations can presumably be ignored in the energy and determination to
forge a new nation. Individuals may get protection, but not ethnic
minorities. But if an indigenous nation becomes dominant in a state, as
the English did in the British Isles, what happened to the Celtic
nations - the Scots, the Irish, the Welsh, the Cornwallians? What
happened in France to the Bretons and Basques? What happened in Spain
to the Basques and Catalans? What happened to the non-Magyar minorities
as it attempted to forcibly assimilate the various minorities in what
would become Hungary? Minority rights, particularly political, language
and cultural rights, tend to be swamped by the ambitions and energies
of the newly flourishing nation. And if a nation is divided among a
number of separate states, compared to 'new nation' imperialism and
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indigenous nationalist imperialism, the pan-nationalist roots of
nationalism seems to be the one most intolerant of all of national
minorities, frequently blaming those 'cosmopolitans' for sapping the
strength of unity from the national ethos. But when there are a number
of nations competing for primacy in a new state, as in many states in
Africa, the national competition often becomes both a vehicle and an
excuse for the primary authority of the state to shift from the rule of
law to the rule of force, since the state has presumably been given the
monopoly on the use of coercive force. Whether a state is used to forge
and unite a nation, as in the nations of the new world or the ex-
colonial states, or when a nation seeks to and preserve itself in a
state as in indigenous and pan-nationalist movements, minorities and
individual rights always seem to be at risk.
 What then do we make of developments in the new Europe with its
attempt to forge a superstate out of many nations? What we have is the
raising of the right of free passage of goods, services and people from
the nation-state to the super state, to the realm of European Community
as a whole. Further, Europe not only has the duty of creating an
economic community, but a common community of rights under the rule of
law protected by the court in Strasburg.18 Once the nation had secured
its national identity through sovereign control of the apparatus of a
state, the instrument of a superstate through the voluntary will of its
constituent nations could be used to broaden and entrench both the
economic freedoms and human rights of individuals which is the
responsibility of a state apparatus. For though the superstate and
European integration in particular poses some risk to national
identity, its primary function is to enable that national identity to
be preserved lest internecine wars and/or superpower battles end up
destroying Europe altogether.19
 I believe we are entering a new world order to succeed the post
World War I regime and the post World War II regime. It is one that
will recognize the fundamental legitimate rights of nations to have a
sovereign state of their own and not sacrifice that right to
preservation of a false and temporary stability. This means the
sanctity of borders will no longer be sacrosanct. There will be a
danger of greater instability. But if this new emergence of nationality
is also accompanied by the insistence on the rule of law, the
protection of the rights of individuals and the protection of the right
of minorities it need not entail forced transfer of populations in a
silly, fruitless and destructive effort to create homogeneous nations
within a state. The post World War I regime will be resurrected, but
with voluntarism replacing coercion as the basis for change and the
rule of law on a superstate level, one willing even to use force when
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the rights of a minority population are threatened or they are coerced
into flight.
The new international order for the protection of refugees must
blend some of the methods of protecting refugees and the rights of
nations developed after the first world war with the development of
superstate law and the legal protections for rights and refugees
developed in the aftermath of the second world war. Otherwise, Europe
and North America, when flooded with refugees from these conflicts
largely rooted in ethnic disputes (though not always - Iran is a
throwback to the era of the Huegenots when religious hegemony was the
main and original source of refugee flows in the modern world), will
more and more seek ways to deter refugees from entering but without
putting in place the instruments to counter the forces that give rise
to the flows in the first place.
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